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I. Introduction 
Events since the cessation of the hostilities during the Gulf Crisis have demonstrated conclusively the mistake that was made in not allowing the 
forces of the Coalition of Nations, operating in the Persian Gulfin 1990-1991, to 
occupy Iraq in its entirety. The Iraqi Army was in full retreat with thousands of its 
members surrendering. Saddam Hussein and his aides could have been made 
prisoners ofwar1 and they could have been put on trial for violations ofinternational 
law, and particularly of the law of war.2 Had this been done, there would have been 
no need for embargoes and no difliculty in searching for, and destroying, nuclear, 
chemical, and biological plants, weapons, and materials in Iraq. 
This essay examines, in retrospect, whether a legal basis existed for the 
establishment of an International Military Tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and 
his aides for war crimes in the Persian Gul£ It argues that a legal basis for such 
a Tribunal existed and still exists. It will do so by first establishing the legal 
foundation for and jurisdiction of a war crimes tribunal in the Persian Gul£ It 
will then describe the substantive law that the Tribunal would apply. Finally, it 
will outline the substantive evidence of war crimes already available that could 
be presented before the Tribunal, including, but not limited to, violations of the 
rights of foreign and protected persons, other human rights violations, and 
environmental destruction and use of chemical and biological weapons.3 
II. Legal Foundation For And Jurisdiction of a War Crimes Tribunal 
in the Persian Gulf 
The provisions of the 1945 London Charter which created the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) 4 were the foundation for most of the war crimes 
* An earlier, and necessarily much less detailed, version of this article was presented 
at a Conference entided Crisis in the Gulf: Enforcing the Rule of Law, sponsored by 
the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association, 
at the International Club, Washington, D.C., onJan. 30-31,1991. The author also made 
a presentation on the subject at a hearing on War Crimes: Hearing bifore the Subcommittee 
on International Law, Immigration and Rifugees if the Committee on the Judiciary if the House 
if Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., (1991). 
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directives promulgated in Europe after W orId War II,S and they were repeated 
ahnost verbatim in the corresponding activity in the Far East.6 There was, 
therefore, adequate precedent for the members of the Coalition of Nations 
involved in the Gulf War to draft and become Parties to an agreement such as 
the London Charter. This agreement would contain provisions for the 
establishment and procedure of an International Tribunal similar to, but not 
necessarily identical with, those contained in the London Charter. Moreover, 
we now have the additional precedents of the establishment, by the Security 
Council of the United Nations, of an International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia,7 and an International Tribunal for the trial of persons accused of 
having committed war crimes in Rwanda, or in neighboring States by 
Rwandans, during the year 1994.8 Therefore, in its 1991 cease-fire Resolution, 
the Security Council might well have declared its intention to establish an 
International Tribunal for the trial of persons accused of having ordered or 
committed war crimes in Kuwait and in Iraq on and after August 2, 1990.9 
There is one jurisdictional issue that would undoubtedly be raised by the 
defense ifSaddam Hussein and other members of the Iraqi military were to be 
tried by an International Tribunal. Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of WarlO provided that any sentence 
adjudged against a prisoner of war must be "by the same tribunals and in 
accordance with the same procedure as in the case of persons belonging to the 
armed forces of the Detaining Power." 11 In the famous Yamashita Case,12 the 
United States Supreme Court held that this provision did not apply to trials for 
pre-capture offenses (war crimes), but only to offenses committed while under 
the status of a prisoner of war. This decision was almost uniformly adofted by 
the courts of other countries trying war crimes cases after W orId War II. 1 When 
the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference drafted the new version of the 1929 
Convention,14 its Article 102 included a provision similar to that contained in 
Article 63 of the 1929 version but ending with the phrase "and if, furthermore, 
the provisions of the present Chapter have been observed." 15 In addition, the 
Conference then drafted Article 85 of that Chapter which states, "[p]risoners of 
war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior 
to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present 
C . ,,16 onventlon. 
Undoubtedly, one purpose of this provision was to establish a rule contrary 
to that of the Yamashita CaseY That is, to make the provisions of Article 102 
applicable to all trials of prisoners of war by a Detaining Power, whether the 
offense charged was alleged to have been committed prior to, or after, the 
accused became a prisoner of war. 18 The question which then arises is: Does 
this preclude the trial of a prisoner of war for war crimes by an internationally 
constituted tribunal? The answer would appear to be in the negative as such a 
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trial would not be "prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power," but 
under international law. Furthennore, the accused would not be tried by a 
Detaining Power but by an international entity. While the Commentary on the 
1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, prepared by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, advances a contrary interpretation of that phrase, 
its reasoning is not particularly convincing.19 Further, the Commentary states 
that Article 129 of the Convention, an article concerned specifically with the 
punishment of "grave breaches" of the Convention, "does not exclude handing 
over the accused to an international criminal court whose competence has been 
. d b h C . P . ,,20 recogmze y t e ontractmg ames. 
It appears that if a Detaining Power elects to try a prisoner of war pursuant 
to its national law, for a war crime committed prior to capture, it must do so 
"by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of a member 
of the anned forces of the Detaining Power.,,21 However, if the trial is by an 
International Tribunal whose members have been elected by the Security 
Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, or have been selected by 
the members of a Coalition or by the Parties to a convention on the subject, 
such a Tribunal would have jurisdiction despite the above-mentioned provisions 
of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. The applicable rules of 
procedure and evidence could be included in the Charter of the Tribunal, as in 
the case of the International Military Tribunal which sat in Nuremberg, or they 
could be drafted and adopted by the members of the Tribunal, as in the case of 
the International Tribunal for the Fonner Yugoslavia.22 
III. The Substantive Law of the Tribunal 
Having established that our International Tribunal would have jurisdiction 
to try individuals for war crimes alleged to have been committed during the 
Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, and assuming that its substantive provisions, 
like the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Fonner Yugoslavia, are 
based on Article 6 of the London Charter,23 the provisions of that article would 
be applicable to the actions of Saddam Hussein and his military commanders. 
A. Article 6(a): Crimes Against Peace 
Article 6(a) of the London Charter states; 
Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war 
of aggression, or a war in violation of intemational treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing?4 
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A number of writers have urged that in the post World War II trials this 
provision constituted the creation of an offense ex post facto. 25 This was also the 
contention of those accused at Nuremberg and Tokyo, as well as in other cases 
where the accused were charged with waginf aggressive war. Nevertheless, both 
the International Military Tribunal (IMT)2 and its counterpart in the Far East, 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)27 ruled that such 
a crime already existed in international law. Professor B. V. A. Roling, the Dutch 
judge on the IMTFE, dissented from this ruling.28 However, in an article written 
some years later he stated that the IMTFE had: 
recognized the legal existence of the crime against peace as defined in the 
Charter. In so doing it contributed to the recognition of this crime. Its decision, 
combined with later actions taken within the United Nations, confirmed the crime 
. . d· . nall 29 agaInst peace as a crune un er mtematto aw. 
Thus, it appears that since at least 1945, if not before, the waging of aggressive 
war, as well as the waging of war in violation of international treaties, has been a 
violation of international law and a war crime. Recognizing the severity of this 
offense the IMT said, "[t]o institute a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an 
international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other 
war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole. ,,30 
B. Application cif Article 6(a) and the LAw cif Aggression Against Saddam Hussein. 
In examining whether Saddam Hussein's actions fall within the purview of 
Article 6(a),31 it is necessary to refer to Article 5 of the 1945 Pact of the League 
of Arab States?2 Both Iraq and Kuwait were original Parties to this treaty, Article 
5 of which specifically prohibits the use of force for the resolution of disputes 
between member states. Better known, of course, are the provisions of Article 
2(4) of the United Nations Charter which require members (and both Iraq and 
Kuwait are members) to refrain "from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. ,,33 Mter many decades 
of debate, that provision has been amplified by the General Assembly resolution 
entided Definition of Aggression.34 This Resolution provides in its Article 1 
that "[a]ggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State ... ,,35 but also 
specifies, in Article 3(a), that the following qualifY as acts of aggression: 
The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such 
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another 
State or part thereo£36 
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Moreover, Article 5(2) of the resolution states that "[a] war of aggression is 
a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international 
responsibility.,,37 It seems indisputable that Saddam Hussein has been guilty of 
this international crime and that he could have been indicted and tried therefor. 
In addition, it is equally clear that he has been guilty not only of planning, 
preparing, initiating, and waging a war of aggression against Kuwait, but also 
that his actions have been in violation of international treaties and agreements 
to which both Iraq and Kuwait were Parties. 
Article 6(b) of the London Charter states: 
War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor 
or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder 
or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, 
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or 
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.38 
Both Article 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War39 and Article 130 of the 1949 Geneva 
Prisoner of War Convention,40 to which Iraq and Kuwait (as well as most 
countries of the world) are Parties, list as "grave breaches" almost all of the acts 
listed in Article 6(b) of the London Charter, as well as a number of additional 
acts. Thus, a court trying war crimes cases today is even better supplied with 
specifications of substantive international criminal law than were the courts 
which tried those cases after World War II. 
Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.41 United States mili~ 
forces were ordered to the Persian Gulffive days later, on August 7, 1990.4 
Saddam Hussein announced the annexation of Kuwait on August 8, 1990.43 
Mter World War II the contention was frequendy advanced that because an 
invaded country had been incorporated into Germany, the law of war, and 
specifically the law of military occupation, no longer offered protection to the 
inhabitants of the occupied territory. Concerning this contention the IMT said: 
In the view of the Tribunal it is unnecessary in this case to decide whether this 
doctrine of subjugation, dependent as it is upon military conquest, has any 
application where the subjugation is the result of the crime of aggressive war. The 
doctrine was never considered to be applicable so long as there was an army in 
the field attempting to restore the occupied countries to their true owners ... 44 
The subjugation of Kuwait by Iraq was, without question, "the result of the 
crime of aggressive war"-but was there an army in the field, opposing Iraq, on 
August 8, 1990? The answer to that question must be in the negative. Kuwait 
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had been overrun and its anny had disintegrated. Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia 
had mobilized its anned forces prior to this date, and had an anny in the field; 
but that anny was mobilized solely for self-defense against an Iraqi attack. It was 
not to "restore [Kuwait] to its true owners." While it might be urged that the 
United States forces (and those of the other nations which soon assembled in 
Saudi Arabia, on the Iraqi border) were "an anny in the field," at that time those 
forces lacked both national and international authority to restore Kuwait to the 
Kuwaitis. This raises the issue which the IMT felt it unnecessary to decide: Does 
the doctrine of subjugation apply where the subjugation is the result of a criminal 
war of aggression? Or, as in the context of this particular problem, does the law 
of war protect civilian inhabitants (and prisoners of war) of a country victimized 
by a war of aggression and fonnally annexed by the aggressor? 
The doctrine applied by the IMT, that there could be no annexation of 
occupied territory while there was an opposing anny in the field, was based 
upon the principle that any annexation announced before the conflict had fully 
terminated and peace had been restored was unlawful. Today, Article 5(3) of 
the Definition of Aggression states that "[n]o territorial acquisition or special 
advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful. ,,45 While 
it is true that resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations are not 
.binding, it would certainly appear that the provision with respect to aggression 
quoted above is an expression of present-day customary international law. In 
other words, it is a principle of customary international law that there can be no 
lawful annexation resulting from an aggressive war; ergo Iraq's annexation of 
Kuwait was unlawful. Moreover, Security Council Resolution 662, adopted on 
August 9, 1990, stated that the Security Council, "[dJecides that the annexation 
of Kuwait by Iraq under any fonn and whatever pretext has no legal validity, 
and is considered null and void. ,,46 In this Resolution, the Security Council also 
decided "to continue its efforts to put an early end to the occupation.,,47 
If the annexation was unlawful, then the status of Kuwait continued to be 
one of military occupation, a status which began on August 2, 1990, and which 
continued thereafter despite Iraq's unlawful attempt to change it to one of 
ownership by annexation on August 8,1990. Moreover, Article 47 of the 1949 
Geneva Civilians Convention provides,"[p]rotected persons who are in 
occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner 
whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention ... by any annexation 
by the latter [Occupying Power] of the whole or part of the occupied 
territory.,,48 
Accordingly, it must be concluded that the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq was 
a nullity, and that subsequent to August 2, 1990, Iraq was bound by the law of 
war and, specifically, by the law of military occupation. 
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IV. Substantive Evidence of Iraqi Offenses 
A. Violations cif the Rights cif Foreign Nationals and Protected Persons 
The 1907 Hague Regulations 49 and the two 1949 Geneva Conventions 
referred to above, contain provisions which, as will be discussed later, were 
violated by the Iraqi anny in Kuwait and in Iraq. The violations occurred both 
before and after the unlawful annexation. Convincing evidence of these offenses 
was collected and evaluated by the appropriate authorities during the course of, 
and after the hostilities. 50 Moreover, infonnation with respect to numerous 
offenses against the law of war was available through the media, including the 
official Iraqi television, and from a report prepared by Amnesty International.51 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, there were many Americans 
and other foreign nationals in both Kuwait and Iraq. As these individuals were 
not allowed to leave Iraq, they had the status of "protected persons" and were 
entitled to all of the protections afforded by the 1949 Geneva Civilians 
Convention. Articles 48 and 35 thereof provide that protected persons "who 
are not nationals of the Power whose territory is occupied" have the right to 
leave the occupied territory, "unless their departure is contrary to the national 
interests of the State.,,52 The exception was included primarily to enable a State 
to prevent neutral persons, who were important to its economy, from leaving 
the occupied territory. Its purpose was not to enable a belligerent to detain such 
individuals as hostages.53 The United States nationals, among others, were not 
only compelled to remain in Kuwait and in Iraq in violation of Article 48, but 
they were held there as hostages. This was well publicized and verified by the 
returnees, and constituted a violation of Article 134 of the Geneva Civilians 
Convention. This Convention specifically prohibits the taking of hostages and 
Article 147 makes such action a "grave breach" of that Convention. 54 Moreover, 
these hostages were frequently forced to remain in military installations and 
annament factories (including those producing chemical weapons), in an effort 
to deter the Coalition anned forces from attacking these sites by air 
bombardment. This violated Article 28 of that Convention which specifically 
prohibits using protected persons "to render certain points or areas immune 
fi mili· . ,,55 rom tary operatIons. 
There have been reports that thousands of persons, foreign, Kuwaiti, and 
Iraqi, who were in Kuwait as refugees from Iraq, were deported from Kuwait 
to Iraq. This was a violation of Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Civilians 
Convention which prohibits "[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as 
deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the 
Occupying Power ... ,,56 Furthennore, Article 147 provides that a violation of 
this provision is a "grave breach" of the Convention-a war crime.57 
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B. Other Human Rights Violations 
In referring to the massive violations of human rights which occurred in 
Kuwait immediately after the Iraqi invasion and occupation of that country, the 
Amnesty International Report contains the following statement, "[t]hese include 
the arbitrary arrest and detention without trial of thousands of civilians and 
[Kuwaiti] military personnel; the widespread torture of such persons in custody; 
the imposition of the death penalty and the extrajudicial execution of hundreds 
f d . ili' . 1 di hildr ,,58 o unarme CIV ans, Inc u ng c en. 
Murder and torture are specifically prohibited by Article 32 of the 1949 
Geneva Civilians Convention and both are listed among the "grave breaches" 
of Article 147. According to the Amnesty International Report, hundreds of 
extrajudicial executions were carried out. 59 Some of these were apparently 
occasioned by the refusal of the Kuwaiti citizens involved to pledge allegiance 
to Saddam Hussein. Civilians detained by the Iraqis were required to pledge 
such allegiance in order to obtain theirfreedom.60 Article 45 of the 1907 Hague 
Regulations forbids compelling the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear 
allegiance to the hostile Power.61 
The Amnesty International Report also indicates that: 
[W]idespread destruction and looting of public and private property was carried 
out. Most critical of these has been the looting of medicines, medical equipment 
and food supplies. The massive scale of destruction and looting which has been 
reported suggests that such incidents were neither arbitrary nor isolated, but rather 
reflected a policy adopted by the government ofIraq.62 
These actions violated Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which 
prohibits wanton destruction of property; Articles 46 and 56 thereof which 
protect private property and that of municipalities and institutions; and Article 
47 of those Regulations, which prohibits pillage. 63 Article 53 of the 1949 Geneva 
Civilians Convention likewise prohibits the destruction and appropriation of 
real or personal property not justified by military necessity and Article 147 makes 
h d · .." b h" f h C . 64 suc estructlOn or appropnanon a grave reac 0 t at onvennon. 
Iraqi television is reported to have shown two captured American airmen 
being paraded through the streets of Baghdad. It also conducted on-screen 
interviews of prisoners of war from the United States and other Coalition 
nations. Both of these actions were violations of Article 13 of the 1949 Geneva 
Prisoner of War Convention which specifically provides that prisoners of war 
must be ~rotected against "intimidation and against insults and public 
curiosity." 5 Similar actions during World War II resulted in a number of 
convictions for violations of this aspect of the laws and customs of war.66 
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Moreover, in the first few interviews each of the prisoners of war looked battered 
and bewildered and made a statement favorable to Iraq-which would seem to 
indicate that at least some of the prisoners, if not all, had either been coerced by 
force or drugged.67 
Iraq announced that it had placed prisoners of war in economic and scientific 
centers. As in the 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention, the 1949 Geneva Prisoner 
of War Convention, in its Article 23(1), specifically prohibits using the presence 
of prisoners of war "to render certain points or areas immune from military 
. ,,68 
operatlons. 
War crimes trials conducted after World War II demonstrated that where 
there was a general pattern of violations of the law of war, it was the result of 
orders emanating from the top echelons of leadership-in this case, Saddam 
Hussein and his agents. It was on this basis that many of the higher-ranking Nazi 
officials were convicted of conventional war crimes. This rule of customary 
international law has now been incorporated into conventional international 
law. Article 29 of the 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention states, "[t]he Party to 
the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be, is responsible for the 
treatment accorded to them by its a~ents, irrespective of any individual 
responsibility which may be incurred." 9 Articles 12(1) and 131 of the 1949 
Geneva Prisoner of War Convention are to the same effect?O 
No attempt has been made to list and discuss every war crime that may have 
been committed by Iraq. However, those that have been enumerated indicate 
an almost total disregard for the provisions of the customary and conventional 
law of war. When the Coalition captured its first Iraqi armed soldiers, the men 
who composed the anti-aircraft crews on the oil platforms off the coast of 
Kuwait, the United States informed the Iraqi Government that the Coalition 
would comply with the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention and that it 
expected the same ofIraq.71 However, based upon the non-compliance by both 
sides during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), it was undoubtedly realized that 
this Convention, as well as other law of war conventions, would be the subject 
of similar widespread violations by the Iraqis in this conflict.72 Referring back 
to Article 6(b) of the London Charter, it will be found that with one or two 
exceptions (for example, the murder of persons on the high sea/\ Saddam 
Hussein and his followers have substantially violated that provision. 
C. Wanton Environmental Destruction 
The Governments have been exceedingly slow in draftini law-of-war 
agreements, or even provisions, for protecting the environment? Concerning 
Iraqi actions against the environment the following was found?5 
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The Gulf was fouled when between seven and nine million barrels of oil were 
discharged into it by Iraq. In the desert, five hundred and ninety oil wellheads 
were damaged or destroyed: five hundred and eight of them were set on fire, and 
the remaining eighty-two were damaged in such a manner that twenty-five to 
fifty million barrels of oil flowed freely from them onto the desert floor. The result 
was total devastation of the fragile desert ecological system and the pollution of 
water sources critical to survival .... 
From 9 to 12July 1991, the Government of Canada, in concert with the Secretary 
General of the United Nations, hosted a conference of international experts in 
Ottawa, Ontario, to consider the law of war implications of the environmental 
devastation caused by the Iraqis. There was general agreement that the actions 
cited constitute violations of the law of war, specifically: 
a. Article 23(g) of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting 
the Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907, forbids the destruction of 
"enemy property unless imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;" and, 
b. Article 147 of the GC [1949 Geneva Civilians Convention], makes the 
"extensive destruction ... of property, not justified by military necessity and 
carried out unlawfully and wantonly" a grave breach?6 
Clearly, the oil well destruction by Iraq served no military purpose, but was 
designed to wreck Kuwait's future, carrying a scorched earth policy to the 
77 
extreme. 
D. Use if Chemical and Biological Weapons 
The use of chemical and biological weapons is worthy of attention. In 1925 
a Protocol was drafted in Geneva prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, 
poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices. It 
also prohibits "the use of bacteriological methods ofwarfare.,,78 Iraq is a Party 
to this Protocol as are most of the nations represented in the multilateral force 
which opposed Iraq?9 Nevertheless, Iraq has used poison gas against Iran and 
against Kurdish and Shiite rebels in its own territory. It was apparendy well 
supplied with this type of weapon and had threatened that in the event of 
hostilities by the Coalition forces it would use poison gas not only against the 
armed forces facing it, but also against Israel, which had played no part in the 
confrontation. While Iraq did fire a number of missiles against Israel, they had 
conventional warheads. 
There are some claims that it did use gas or biological weapons during the 
hostilities. If proven that Iraq did so, this will be one more treaty Iraq will have 
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violated, and one more war crime or a crime against humanity to be charged 
against Saddam Hussein and his agents. 
Article 6(c) of the London Charter contains the following definition of crimes 
against humanity: 
Crimes against humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds 
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domesticlaw of the country where 
perpetrated.80 
With respect to this category of offenses, the IMT said, "from the beginning 
of the war in 1939 war crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were also 
crimes against humanity."Sl If one substitutes 1990 for 1939 in that statement, 
it apdy describes the situation in Kuwait and, perhaps, in Iraq. 
V. Conclusion 
This essay has demonstrated that if custody of Saddam Hussein and the 
members of his Military Council could be obtained, they could be charged and 
tried for having committed crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. To do so would require some or 
all of the States which actively supported the actions against Iraq (or the Security 
Council of the United Nations) to reach an agreement under which a Tribunal 
would be established, evidence collected, charges made, and a trial, or trials, 
conducted.82 
In any event, it is to be hoped that in the light of the experience in the Persian 
Gulf, and the problems that Saddam Hussein has caused in the implementation 
of the cease-fire resolution, should he or another military despot disturb the 
peace of the world at some future date, the international community will not 
commit the same mistake of not making him pay for his crimes. 
Notes 
1. Unfortunately, as so often happens, to have included a provision concerning trials for war crimes in 
the terms of the cease fire enunciated in U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), would undoubtedly have lengthened 
the period of hostilities. EventuaIly, this would have resulted in Saddam Hussein and other high ranking Iraqis 
seeking refuge in a country that would have granted them asylum and would have refused to try or extradite 
them as required by international agreements to which all of the States involved are Parties. 
2. One eminent student of this area of international law has made a case for Saddam Hussein's 
assassination. Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would It Be a Crime?, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1990, at D1. 
Although the word "assassination" is inherently repulsive, this is not an idea that should be dismissed out of 
hand. Saddam Hussein was a uniformed member of the Iraqi Army and was, therefore, a legitimate target. 
Killing him during the course of hostilities would have been a legitimate act of war and not an assassination. 
During World War II the British in Africa mounted an unsuccessful operation in North Africa the sole purpose 
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of which was to kill German Field Marshal Rommel and his staff. In the Pacific, the United States mounted 
a successful operation aimed specifically at killing Japanese Admiral Yamamoto. (If the attempt to assassinate 
Hitler by members of the German resistance had been successful, World War II would have probably ended 
a year or so earlier and thousands oflives might have been saved at the cost of one life, which was already 
forfeited.) 
3. One of the most extensive, if somewhat biased, reviews of the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 can 
be found in GREENPEACE, ON IMPACT: MODERN WARFARE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, A CASE STUDY OFTHE 
GULF WAR (1991) [hereinafter ON IMPACT]. For a broad, general view of the matter, seeJohn N. Moore, 
War Crimes and the Rule rifLaw in the GuifCrisis, 31 VA.J. INT'L L. 403 (1991). Moore properly concludes 
that, u[p]erhaps the most important reason for holding war crimes trials in the Gulf crisis is that we must bring 
deterrence home to totalitarian elites if we are to be most effective in avoiding aggressive war and human 
rights violations." See id. at 405. Perhaps, if there had been war crimes trials after the Gulf Crisis, the leaders 
of the various parts of the former Yugoslavia would have given more thought to compliance with the law of 
war in the conflict in Bosnia; see also Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and 
Hostage-Taking, 31 VA.]. INT'L L. 351 (1991). 
4. Charter of the International Military Tribunal attached to the Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,59 Stat. 1544,82 U.N.T.S. 27 
(hereinafter Charter of the International Military Tribunal]; HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR: THE 
LAW OF WAR CRIMES 549 (1993) (hereinafter WAR CRIMES]. The Charter was drafted by representatives of 
France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Agreement to which it was 
attached was subsequently adhered to by nineteen other nations. See id. at 51. 
5. See e.g., Allied Control Council Law No.1 0, Dec. 20, 1945, 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 23 (1947) (hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS); see also WAR 
CRIMES, supra note 4, at 558. 
6. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE),Jan. 19, 1946, as amended 
Apr. 26, 1946, T.LA.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20, 27; WAR CRIMES, supra note 4, at 571. This Charter was 
issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the post-World War II Military Governor 
of Japan, and was approved by the Far East Commission, the Allied body which was created to exercise overall 
political control of Japan during the Occupation. 
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